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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND
DESCRIPTION OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This matter is before the Supreme Court on Petition
for Review of an adverse determination by the Utah State Tax
Commission in a formal adjudicative proceeding on Petitioner
Larry Zissi's Petition for Redetermination of a jeopardy tax
assessment against him under the provisions of the Illegal
Drug Stamp Tax Act, Utah Code Annotated § 59-19-101 et seq. (1953,
as amended).
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this Petition
for Review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-16 and
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3) (e) (ii) (1953, as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Should the Tax Commission have granted Zissi's

motion to suppress evidence of the pills on which the tax
was based because their discovery was the result of an
unconstitutional roadblock seizure?
2.

Did the Tax Commission err in ruling that the

amphetamines at issue were not taxable by weight?
3.

Did the Tax Commission err in its construction

the statutory term "dosage units"?
4.

Does the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violate

Zissi's constitutional right to equal protection?
5.

Is the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act unconsti-

tutionally vague?
6.

Does the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violate

2
petitioner's right to freedom from self-incrimination?
7.

Is the tax assessed in this case an unconsti-

tutionally excessive fine?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
BELIEVED DETERMINATIVE
Petitioner believes that the interpretation of the
following statutes and constitutional provisions is determinative
in this case. The complete text of the statutes and constitutional
provisions cited is included in Addendum A attached at the
end of this brief:
Utah Code Annotated § 59-19-103 (1953, as amended)
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
United States Constitution, Amendment V
United States Constitution, Amendment VIII
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 9
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 12
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 24
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for review of a determination
of the State Tax Commission upholding a jeopardy assessment
of $22,000.00 in tax and $22,000.00 in penalties against petitioner
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Larry Zissi (hereinafter "Zissi") under Utah's Illegal Drug
Stamp Tax Act, U.C.A. § 59-19-101 et seq. (1953, as amended)
(the "Stamp Tax").
The facts as found by the Tax Commission or, where
no findings were made on factual issues, all relevant evidence
on those issues, are as follows.

On June 4, 1988, Zissi was

stopped at a driver's license roadblock while driving his
1983 Chevrolet pickup truck,

(Findings of Fact R.6). The

roadblock was set up by five officers, including St* Doug
Whitney and four deputies.

(R.99).

Sgt. Whitney was in charge

of setting up the roadblock, and it was set up at his instigation.
Sgt. Whitney is a sergeant on patrol with the Utah County
Sheriff's Department.

(R.101).

It was Sgt. Whitney's decision

to set up the roadblock (R.102).

He gave his deputies verbal

instructions to stop every vehicle for a driver's license
and registration, to make sure that everything was current
and up to date.

No written instructions were given.

He also

told his deputies that if they found other violations to take
appropriate action.
he gave.

That was the extent of the directions

(R.102).
The roadblock was set up on State Road 73 at Fairfield,

and was set up from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m.

The deputies placed

signs 100 yards before the roadblock which said "Sheriff's
Office Roadblock Ahead."

At the roadblock itself, there were
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approximately eight pylon cones placed twenty to thirty feet
apart.

Then there was a cone with the sign "Sheriff's Roadblock

Ahead." (R.98-100).
After Mr. Zissi's vehicle was stopped at the roadblock,
one of the deputies smelled an odor of marijuana.

(R.102).

After directing Mr. Zissi to drive to the side of the road,
Mr. Zissi handed over a baggy of marijuana.

(R.103).

The

officers then searched the vehicle and located a shaving cream
bag behind the driver's seat of the pickup (R.103).
that bag were found what appeared to be crosstop pills.

Inside
(R.104).

Wayne Holman of the Tax Commission later counted the pills
and determined that there were more than 500 and there were
some that had been broken in pieces in transport and some
had become powdered fragments.
as 519.

He counted the total number

(R.129).
Attached as Exhibit "B" to the Respondent's Brief

submitted after the conclusion of the hearing was a document
on Utah County Sheriff letterhead dated October 11, 1984,
prepared by Lt. David Lamph regarding roadblocks. This document
requires no need for establishment of a license and registration
roadblock, places no restrictions on where or when such roadblocks
will be instituted other than they are to be in a "safe location,"
places no restrictions on how to choose which cars will be
stopped, and apparently allows driver's license and registration

5
r o a d b l o c k s t o be s e t up i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of any s e r g e a n t
on p a t r o l in the f i e l d for the Utah County S h e r i f f ' s Department.
(R.46-47).
After being advised by the Utah County

Sheriff's

Office of the seizure, the Utah State Tax Commission issued
a jeopardy assessment against Mr. Zissi for tax and penalty
totalling $44,000.00.

(Exhibit 8, R.195-198) . U.C.A. § 59-19-103

provides in relevant part as follows:
(1)

A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled
substances as defined under this chapter at
the following rates:
(a) , , .
(b)

On each gram of controlled substance or
each portion of a gram, $200; and

(c)

On each bO dosage units of a controlled
substance that is not sold by weight,
or portion thereof, $2,000.

The statute contains no definition of the term "dosage
units."

Although the Tax Commission is authorized to adopt

rules necessary to enforce the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act,
U.C.A. § 59-19-107(1), the Tax Commission has not issued any.
(R.125).
In making its jeopardy assessment, the Tax Commission
first determined that the tax should be assessed under Subparagraph
(c) on the number of dosage units of a controlled substance
that is not sold by weight, rather than under Subparagraph
(b) according to the weight of the controlled substance.
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The Tax Commission found that amphetamines such
as these are sold as pills and not sold by weight.

(Findings

of Fact 13, R.7). Gary Nuffer of the Tax Commission testified
that his only basis for assessing the pills in this case according
to the number of pills was "in our dealings and in our policy
or procedures that we've done this that these were not sold
by weight.

They were sold by units."

(R.122).

Wayne Holman, an investigator for the Tax Commission, testified that amphetamines are sold by weight in powder
form.

He stated that if these pills had been ground into

powder form, they would be taxed by weight.

(R.128).

He

said they look at the form of the substance to determine whether
it was sold by weight or otherwise.

(R.128).

He agreed he

had no knowledge of whether the pills in this case had been
sold by weight or by the number of pills.

(R.128).

Loni DeLand, a criminal defense attorney and former
narcotics agent, testified that amphetamines can be used by
injection, inhalation, ingestion or by suppositories.

They

can be used any of these ways whether the amphetamines are
purchased as a pill or as a powder.

In order to inject them,

you would have to grind up the pills into powder form.

He

testified that amphetamines are primarily sold by weight in
powder form.

He didn't recall purchasing pills by weight,

but supposed they could be.

(R.138).
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Kendra Herlin, a narcotics agent called by the Tax
Commission, testified that she had not seen amphetamine tablets
sold by weight.

(R.158).

She said crystal methamphetamine

powder is more expensive than pills.

(R.169).

After determining that the amphetamines which had
been seized should be taxed at the rate of $2,000.00 per each
50 dosage units, the Tax Commission construed each pill as
a "dosage unit" under the statute.

(Findings of Fact 12f R.7).

Gary Nuffer's understanding of the term "dosage"
is "what you would consume at one time."

(R.123).

But based

on the advice of the Commission's investigator, Wayne Holman,
he imposed a tax based on one pill being one dosage unit.
(R.122).

Mr. Nuffer said that the Commission would construe

one pill to be one dosage unit regardless of the size of the
pill.

(R.124).

Wayne Holman said he advised Mr. Nuffer that

each pill is a dosage unit.
. . .
sician.

(R.127).

He said "by definition,

a dose would be something prescribed by a medical phyAnd a unit, by definition, is one item."

(R.127.

He had no information on the quantity of amphetamines generally
prescribed by a physician.

(R.128).

Loni Deland was asked what dosage unit means, and
said that depends to a degree on a person's tolerance.

(R.139).

Some people inject 1/2 gram in one dosage and sometimes more.
He'd seen people take them by the pill form—probably as little
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as 5 at a time on some occasions.

Typically, people would

buy 100 pills and soak the entire thing and inject it.

(R.140).

He testified that the term "dosage unit" would have a definite
meaning for a legal drug.
on the market—Desoxyn.

There is a legal methamphetamine

He said for the pills which were

seized, there is no legal dosage unit, and that to him the
dosage unit is what the abuser takes—1/2 gram is not unusual,
and a truck driver will probably take somewhat less.

He said

in these pills, at 1/2 gram a dosage unit, there would be
5 dosage units.

(R.140-41).

Neither of the dictionaries excerpted as exhibits
had definitions for "dosage unit" or for "unit dose."
9 and 10, R. 199-206).

(Exhibits

Steadman's Medical Dictionary defines

dosage as:
1. The giving of medicine or other therapeutic
agent in prescribed amounts. 2. The determination of the proper dose of a remedy. Often
incorrectly used for the word dose.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines dosage
as including:
l.a. The amount of medicine or other therapeutic
agent prescribed or proper for a given patient
or illness. . . 2.a. Addition of some ingredient
or application of or treatment with some agent
in one or more measured doses
Both dictionaries defined a dose in essentially the same terms.
The Webster's Dictionary defined dose as:
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The measured quantity of a medicine or other
therapeutic agent to be taken at one time or
in a period of time.
Steadman's Medical Dictionary defines unit as:
1. One, a single person or thing. 2. A standard
of measure, weight or any other quality, by
multiplications or fractions of which a scale
or system is formed. 3. A group of persons
or things considered as a whole because of
mutual activities or functions.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes unit,
in relevant part as:
l.a.(l): The first natural number; the number
that is the least whole number and is expressed
by the number one, (2) a single thing that
constitutes an undivided whole. . . .(c) a
determinate quantity as of length, time, heat,
value, or housing, adopted as a standard of
measurement for other quantities of the same
kind.
The value of the pills seized was between $75.00
and $150.00.

(R.139, 161).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Mr. Zissi's motion to suppress all evidence of the
pills seized in this case should have been granted, and the
jeopardy assessment for possession of the pills voided.

The

exclusionary rule applies in tax proceedings, and is especially
applicable to this quasi-criminal tax proceeding, just as
it applies in forfeiture proceedings.

The seizure of Mr. Zissi

and his vehicle at the roadblock in this case violated his
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Fourth Amendment rights because his privacy rights were invaded
at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field, who
determined when, where, and how to set up the roadblock without
any plan instituted by administrative level personnel.
Because the United States Supreme Court has not
ruled on the issue presented, this Court should base its decision
on Utah constitutional grounds.

Further, there is no reason

to allow an exception to the warrant requirement for roadblocks,
and this Court should hold that a statute authorizing roadblocks
and setting forth a procedure for obtaining warrants for roadblocks
is required for a valid roadblock under the Utah Constitution.
Because of the evidence that amphetamines are a
controlled substance which is sold by weight, it was improper
to tax the amphetamines in this case on a per pill basis.
The Tax Commission's construction of the Tax Stamp statute
liberally, rather than strictly, construes the statute and
yields a result which violates Mr. Zissi's right to equal
protection by imposing disproportionate taxation on the same
controlled substance depending only on the meaningless distinction
of whether it is seized in pill or powder form.

Since there

is no evidence of the weight of the pills or that they were
of taxable weight, the jeopardy assessment should be invalidated.
Even if these amphetamines should be taxed according
to the number of "dosage units" they contain, a person of
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ordinary intelligence would understand that term to mean the
amount of a controlled substance which comprises a dosage.
The Tax Commission adopted a liberal definition to maximize
taxability, but that definition is known only to those in
the medical profession.

The interpretation that a dosage

unit means one pill makes the statute in violation of Mr. Zissi's
right to due process by adopting an unconstituionally vague
definition of the term "dosage units."

The evidence shows

the dosage for the pills involved to be at least five, and
closer to 50 pills.

The assessment against petitioner should

be reduced to reflect this.
The Stamp Tax statute does not prohibit the Tax
Commission from providing law enforcement authorities information
relevant to determining the identity of stamp purchasers.
It also requires the stamps to be affixed to the controlled
substances they relate to.

The purchase and display of the

stamps create an appreciable risk of supplying a vital link
in a prosecution for possession of controlled substances

—

the identity of those in possession and their knowledge of
the illegal nature of the substance.

The Stamp Tax therefore

violates Mr. Zissi's right to freedom from self-incrimination
under the Utah and United States Constitutions.
The prohibitions against excessive fines found in
the United States and Utah Constitutions apply with regard
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to the essentially criminal Stamp Tax law.

Because a person

in possession of amphetamine pills is subject to a huge fine
while a person in possession of the same quantity of amphetamine
powder is not taxed, the Stamp Tax violates the principle
of proportionality incorporated in the prohibition against
excessive fines.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16(4) gives guidance
as to the standard of review of the Tax Commission's determinations
of fact and of law.

This Court should grant relief if, on

the basis of the agency's record, Mr. Zissi has been prejudiced
by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule
on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;

(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted
or applied the law;

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination
of fact, made or implied by the agency, that
is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before
the court.
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The facts stated above marshal1 all evidence presented
to the Commission on the factual questions impliedly determined
against him.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).

II.
ALL EVIDENCE OF THE PILLS SEIZED IN
THIS CASE AND ON WHICH THE TAX IS BASED SHOULD BE
SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEY ARE THE FRUIT OF AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ROADBLOCK SEIZURE
A.

The Exclusionary Rule Applies in this Proceeding.
Courts have held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary

rule is applicable in a federal civil tax proceeding.

Efriant

Suriez, 58 T.C. 792 (1972); Pizzarello v. United States, 408
F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180
(N.D. Ohio 1966) ; Vander Linden v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 693
(S.D. Iowa 1980) .
Policy reasons also favor application of the exclusionary
rule in tax proceedings.

Evidence relating to tax matters

often depends on the most personal of a person's effects and
papers, and would often be located in the home.

The power

of taxation is broad and those charged with enforcing it are
often perceived as oppressive.

The exclusionary rule should

apply to prevent a positive incentive for Tax Commission and
law enforcement authorities to violate constitutional rights
of taxpayers in order to find evidence to raise tax revenues.
Thus, the exclusionary rule should apply in state tax proceedings.
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Particularly in this case for the enforcement of
the Stamp Tax, the exclusionary rule should apply.

In One

1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965),
the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies
to civil forfeiture proceedings.

The Supreme Court noted

that the leading case on the subject of search and seizure
is Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) which was itself
not a criminal case but a proceeding by the United States
to forfeit property.

The Supreme Court stated that

A forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in
character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding,
is to penalize for the commission of an offense
against the law . . . .
It would be anomalous
indeed under these circumstances, to hold that
in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized
evidence is excludible, while in the forfeiture
proceeding, requiring the. determination that
the criminal law has been violated, the same
evidence would be admissible. One Plymouth
1958 Sedan v. Pennsylvania, supra at 700-701.
This unusual tax proceeding, like a forfeiture proceeding, involves an additional penalty imposed upon the illegal
possession of controlled substances. The fact that the legislature
has chosen to do so by a tax does not change the character
of the proceeding.

Just as the Supreme Court noted in the

forfeiture situation, the penalties to be imposed upon petitioner
by the tax and tax penalty in this case far exceed any penalties
which could be criminally assessed against him for possession
of the controlled substances or even the criminal penalty
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for failure to obtain the illegal drug stamps. In this situation,
particularly, it is clear that the exclusionary rule must
apply.

B.
The Roadblock Involved in this Case was an Unconstitutional
Seizure, and the Evidence Resulting from that Seizure must
be Suppressed.
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648

(1979), the

Supreme Court held that a patrolman's stopping of a vehicle
without reasonable suspicion to check for license and registration
was an unconstitutional seizure, and that the evidence discovered
as a result of the patrolman's seizing marijuana in plain
view on the car floor must be suppressed.

First, the Court

held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated
because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of those amendments,
even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention quite brief.

j^d. at 654.

The Court summarized

its decision as follows:
We hold that except in those situations where
there is at least articulable and reasonable
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or
that an automobile is not registered, or that
either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise
subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping
an automobile and detaining the driver in order
to check his driver's license and registration
of the automobile are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. This holding does not preclude
the State of Delaware or other States from
developing methods for spot checks that involve
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less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning
of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops
is one possible alternative. J[d. at 664.
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court stated that the
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.

J^d. at 665.

The Supreme Court recognized

that the State had an interest in assuring the safety of its
roadways, but held that discretionary spot checks of license
and registration in service of those interests did not justify
the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interest which such stops
entail.

The Court noted that the primary method of enforcing

traffic and vehicle safety regulations is acting upon observed
violations, that drivers without licenses are presumably the
less safe drivers whose propensities may well exhibit themselves,
and that in the absence of empirical data to the contrary,
"it must be assumed that finding an unlicensed driver among
those who commit traffic violations is a much more likely
event than finding an unlicensed driver by choosing randomly
from the entire universe of drivers." J^d. at 660.
The United States Supreme Court has stated a threefactor test or analysis in balancing the competing interests
to determine the reasonableness of warrantless searches or
seizures as:
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[A] weighing of the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which
the seizure advances the public interest, and
the severity of the interference with individual
liberty. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-55
(1979)
The easiest and most common fallacy in "balancing"
is to place on one side the entire, cumulated
"interest" represented by the state's policy
and compare it with one individual's interest
in freedom from specific intrusion on the other
side. ... [cite] A fairer balance would weigh
the actual expected alleviation of the social
ill against the cumulated interests invaded.
City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775,
778 (1988).
In applying these factors to the situation of warrantless roadblock seizures, the Supreme Court of Kansas has set
out what it considered to be relevant factors.
Among the factors which should be considered
are:
(1) The degree of discretion, if any,
left to the officer in the field; (2) the location
designated for the roadblock; (3) the time
and duration of the roadblock; (4) standards
set by superior officers; (5) advance notice
to the public at large; (6) advance warning
to the individual approaching motorists; (7)
maintenance of safety conditions; (8) degree
of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of
operation; (9) average length of time each
motorist is detained; (10) physical factors
surrounding the location, type and method of
operation; (11) the availability of less intrustive
methods for combatting the problem; (12) the
degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and
(13) any other relevant circumstances which
might bear upon the test. Not all of the factors
need to be favorable to the state but all which
are applicable to a given roadblock should
be considered. Some, of course, such as unbridled
discretion of the officer in the field would
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run afoul of Prouse regardless of other favorable
factors.
State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174,
1185 (Kan. 1983). (emphasis added)
Courts of other states have adopted or approved
the considerations set out by the Kansas Court. State v. Jones,
483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676
(Tex. App. 1985) .

Each of these cases also recognized that

some factors can prove fatal to a roadblock regardless of
the existence of other favorable conditions.

In Webb v. State,

supra, the Texas court specifically agreed that such a factor
is the unbridled discretion of an officer in the field.
681.

Id_. at

In that case, the court stated:
The only criteria supporting the constitutionality
of the roadblock in question is that every
car was stopped. . . . The only evidence of
"an overall plan" is the testimony of the field
officer that he didn't just indiscriminately
happen to pick a street. The record contains
no specific standards established by superior
officers for setting up the roadblock or to
structure the procedure to be followed by the
officers present at the scene. The Fourth
Amendment requires an actual showing that the
proper procedures were followed at the time
of the inspection. I_d. at 683 (emphasis in
original).
Other cases after Delaware v. Prouse, supra, have

held that roadblocks established at the discretion of officers
in the field constitute illegal seizures, the fruits of which
must be suppressed.

In State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 383 N.W.2d

461 (1986), the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that evidence
of intoxication had been illegally obtained as the result
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of an unconstitutional roadblock stop and had to be suppressed.
In that case, four or five patrolmen and a Sergeant determined
to set up a transitory checkpoint at which every fourth vehicle
reaching it would be stopped.

The field officers were not

acting under any standards, guidelines or procedures promulgated
by the policy makers for the police department.

The Nebraska

Court quoted Delaware v. Prouse, supra, regarding a discretionary
stop for license and registration checks as follows:
This kind of standardless and unconstrained
discretion is the evil the Court has discerned
when in previous cases it has insisted that
the discretion of the officer in the field
be circumscribed, at least to some extent.
State v. Crom, supra at 463.
The Court also quoted the following language from Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47 (1979):
A central concern in balancing these competing
considerations in a variety of settings has
been to assure that an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitray
invasions solely at the unfettered discretion
of officers in the field.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska then stated:
The uncontradicted evidence in the case before
us is that there was no plan formulated at
the policymaking level of the Omaha police
department, or elsewhere, which considered,
weighed, and balanced the factors enumerated
in Delaware and Brown. Rather, a six-or-sevenperson unit within the department, commanded
by a field sergeant, was left free to decide
when, where, and how to establish and operate
the transitory checkpoint in question. The
checkpoint was thus subject to the constitutional
infirmity found to exist in both Delaware and
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Brown; that is, a driver's reasonable expectation
of privacy was rendered subject to arbitrary
invasion solely at the unfetered discretion
of officers in the field. Id., at 463.
The South Dakota Supreme Court similarly found a
roadblock unconstitutional when set up at the discretion of
officers in the field, stating "in the absence of record evidence
that the decision to establish the roadblock was made by anyone
other than the officers in the field, the roadblock in question
[has] certain characteristics of a roving patrol" namely,
an appreciable risk of an arbitrary basis for the site or
time decision.

State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976).

Simmons v. Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 656 (Va. 1989)
involved a situation very similar to that presented in this
case.

There, two Virginia State Troopers set up a roadblock

to check driver's licenses, registration and equipment.
stopped all vehicles entering the roadblock.

They

They established

the roadblock without any prior direction from their supervisors
and without an existing plan. The troopers had total discretion
regarding where and when they would set up the roadblock.
The trial court held that because all traffic was stopped
and checked, the seizure did not violate Simmons' Fourth Amendment
rights, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed.

The court

stated:
We do not read Prouse to stand for the proposition
that stopping all traffic at a roadblock constitutes
sufficient restraint on the exercise of discretion
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by police officers to transform the stop into
a constitutionally valid roadblock. . . . [T]he
roadblock also must be undertaken pursuant
to an explicit plan or practice which uses
neutral criteria and limits the discretion
of the officers conducting the roadblock.
The evidence in this case establishes that
the decision to establish the roadblock as
well as its location and duration was solely
within the discretion of the troopers. No
advance approval or authoriztion from any supervisor
or superior officer was required to set up
the roadblock, ^d. at 658-59.
Other cases holding roadblock seizures unconstitutional
because of insufficient constraints on the discretion of officers
in the field include State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court,
136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d
562 (Okl. Cr. 1984); and State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434,
706 P.2d 225 (1985) .
The roadblock in this case suffered from the same
constitutional infirmities as the cases just cited. Particularly,
it involves the fatal defect of unbridled discretion of the
officers in the field.

Sgt. Whitney, the field officer, a

sergeant on patrol who was at the roadblock and in charge
of the other officers there, personally made the decision
to set up the roadblock.

None of the officers were given

written directions about how to set it up or the duration
of it or how to proceed.

Clearly, there was no administrative

level decision, nor any plan instituted after carefully balancing
the interests to be served by the roadblock against the intrusion
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on privacy of all the people to be stopped at the roadblock
prior to its implementation.

Everything about the roadblock

was left to the discretion of the officers in the field and
the precise dangers present in the cases just cited, and condemned
in Delaware v. Prouse were present.

For that reason, the

roadblock stop constituted an unconstitutional seizure, and
the evidence discovered as a result of that seizure must be
suppressed.
In an attempt to show some sort of administrative
level decision regarding the roadblock at issue in this case,
the Collection Division of the Tax Commission attached Exhibit
"B" to its Brief of Respondent before the Tax Commission (R.
46-47) , which purports to be the roadblock policy of the Utah
County Sheriff.

That purported policy is not part of the

record at the hearing and could not be considered by the Tax
Commission or by this Court.

This was a formal hearing under

the provisions of Chapter 46b of Title 63, Utah Code Annotated.
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-10 (1) (a) requires the hearing
officer to make findings of fact "based exclusively on the
evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts
officially noted."
The purported Utah County roadblock policy was not
presented at the hearing, was not given under oath, is not
part of the record, and should be disregarded.

Even if it
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could be considered, the purported policy contains no meaningful
limits on the discretion of officers in the field.

It contains

no limitations on the field officer's selection of a site
for a license and registration roadblock.

It does not contain

any requirement that there be a showing or any existence of
need for license and registration roadblocks.

It contains

nothing limiting the officers' discretion in how to choose
what cars to stop, and contains nothing about the procedures
to be used -- how long to detain cars, what should be said
to those who are stopped, or anything at all about methods
to be used to limit the intrustion on drivers' privacy in
conducting such a roadblock.
Other factors also indicate that the constitutional
balancing required tips the balance toward unconstitutionality
of the roadblock at issue here.

The governmental interest

involved is to locate people driving without valid licenses
or registration. While admittedly a valid interest, the importance
of that interest should not be blown out of proportion. Preventing
drunk driving, for example, is certainly a much more important
interest.

There is no evidence in this case of any problems

experienced by the Utah County Sheriff's Office regarding
unlicensed drivers or unregistered vehicles.

There is no

evidence that the less intrusive method of making stops only
on articulable suspicion of violations is not more effective
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in locating unlicensed drivers or unregistered vehicles.
The United States Supreme Court in Prouse noted that it could
be assumed that unlicensed drivers would be those more likely
to be stopped for traffic violations.

There is no evidence

of the effectiveness of the roadblock procedure in this case.
The record at the hearing contains no evidence of the number
of vehicles stopped or the number of license and registration
violations discovered.
to the public.

There is no evidence of advance notice

The advance warning to motorists occurred

100 yards before the roadblock.

If the roadblock in this

case were found to be constitutional, any policeman anywhere
for no reason at all could on his own initiative set up a
roadblock and detain every single car and driver at his absolute
discretion to seek evidence of violations of which he has
no knowledge or even suspicion.

The seizure of Mr. Zissi

and his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment.

All evidence

of the pills seized from him should be suppressed/ and the
jeopardy assessment against him invalidated.

C.
The Roadblock in This Case Resulted in an Unconstitutional
Seizure under the Utah Constitution.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution also
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures in terms
nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment.

This Court has

indicated an interest in separate constitutional analysis
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under the Utah Constitution

and has held out at least the

possibility of giving the Utah Constitutional provision separate
vitality.
Indeed, choosing to give the Utah Constitution
a somewhat different construction may prove
to be an appropriate method for insulating
the state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given the Fourth Amendment
by the Federal•Courts. State v. Watts, 750
P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988).
In this case, involving warrantless roadblock seizures, it
is appropriate for this Court to rest its ruling on independently
sufficient state constitutional grounds.
The first reason for doing so is that there is no
definitive statement from the United States Supreme Court
regarding the constitutional permissibility of warrantless
roadblock stops.

Without knowing the precise limits which

the United States Supreme Court might set, this Court has
the opportunity to say that under the Utah Constitution, the
roadblock set up in this case at the absolute discretion of
officers in the field is an impermissible invasion of constitutionally protected rights.

This is so for all the reasons

set forth in the cases cited in the preceding section.

It

is also the approach taken by the Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court in State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28,
493 A.2d 1271 (N.J. App. 1985).

In that case, the court relied

on Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution,
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even though it is almost identical in wording to the Fourth
Amendment.

The New Jersey Court analyzed only cases involving

the Fourth Amendment in arriving at this decisionf but determined
to rest its decision on state constitutional grounds by following
the lead suggested by Justice O'Connor in Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983), in which she stated:
It is fundamental that state courts be left
free and unfettered by us in interpreting their
state constitutions.
The New Jersey Court in State v. Kirk, supra, concluded that
a roadblock set up in the absolute, unbridled discretion of
officers in the field was unconstitutional under the New Jersey
Constitution.
The second reason for resting a decision in this
case on adequate state constitutional grounds is that the
developing interpretations of law under the Fourth Amendment
and under Delaware v. Prouse, supra, simply provide inadequate
protection for the vast majority of innocent motorists who
might be subjected to warrantless roadblock seizures of their
vehicles at the whim of the police.

Requiring a roadblock

to be approved and carried out under a plan formulated by
supervisory administrative officials in the police department
is not sufficient protection.

There is nothing to require

an adequate balancing of the competing interests in advance
in such a system.

Generally, warrantless searches and seizures
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which have been held reasonable have been upheld because of
the need to act before a warrant could be obtained.

Such

considerations have resulted in Terry stops on reasonable
suspicionf searches incident to arrest, and searches of automobiles
based on probable cause.
is much different.

But the situation in a roadblock

It is carefully planned in advance.

There

is nothing to prevent some prior authorization for the roadblock,
either in the form of a warrant issued by a judicial officer
or a legislative enactment providing for such roadblocks,
or both.

The situation of roadblocks presents no reason for

abandoning the check and balance of having a non-executive
level decision authorizing a roadblock in advance.
The State of Idaho held roadblocks instituted for
the purpose of detecting driving under the influence of alcohol
to be unconstitutional under the Idaho Constitution, where
the roadblocks were instituted without express legislative
authority, particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing,
or prior judicial approval.

State of Idaho v. Henderson,

114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988).

The Idaho provision,

like the Utah provision, is virtually identical to the Fourth
Amendment.

The Idaho Court stated that:

Roadblocks are an inefficient and unnecessary
constraint on a person's right to remain free
of search or seizure absent probable cause.
Id. 756 P.2d at 1061. (emphasis in original)
The Court also noted that the roadblocks were not conducted
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pursuant to authority granted by the Idaho Legislature.

Id.

Similarly in Utah, there is no legislative authority for roadblocks.

The Idaho Court quoted from a Pennsylvania case as

follows:
While the arguments supporting the constitutionality
of systematic roadblocks are persuasive, the
rational supporting them is flawed. No amount
of control or limited discretion can justify
the "seizure11 that takes place in the complete
absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion
that a motor vehicle violation has occurred.
Id. at 1062.
The Idaho Court also quoted State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562,
564-65 (Okl. App. 1984), as follows:
The court finds such activities by law enforcement
authorities, while commendable in their ultimate
goal of removing DUI offenders from the public
highways, draw dangerously close to what may
be referred to as a police state. Here, the
state agencies have ignored the presumption
of innocence, assuming that criminal conduct
must be occurring on the roads and highways,
and have taken an "end justifies the means"
approach. . . . [A] basic tenet of American
jurisprudence is that the government cannot
assume criminal conduct in effectuating a stop
such as the one presented herein. Were the
authorities allowed to maintain such activities
as presented in this case, the next logical
step would be to allow similar stops for searching
out other types of criminal offenders. State
v. Henderson, supra, 756 P.2d at 1063.
Without determining exactly what would be required to uphold
a roadblock, the Idaho Supreme Court held that:
Where police lack express legislative authority,
particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing
and prior judicial approval, roadblocks established
to apprehend drunk drivers cannot withstand
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constitutional scrutiny.

Id.

The Washington Supreme Court has found DUI roadblocks
to be in violation of the Washington Constitution.

City of

Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775

(1988).

The Washington Constitutional provision prohibits disturbing
a person in his private affairs or invading his home "without
authority of law."

In that case, because the City of Seattle

failed to show that the DUI roadblock fell within an exception
to the warrant requirement, the roadblock was held unconstitutional
under the Washington Constitution.
The Oregon Supreme Court held that a roadblock violated
Article If Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution where there
was no statutory or judicial authorization for the roadblock
given in advance. The Oregon constitutional provision provides:
No law shall violate the right of the people
... against unreasonable search, or seizure,
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause.
The Oregon Supreme Court summarized its decision as follows:
Neither the state nor the county officials
point to a statute or ordinance establishing
an administrative scheme allowing sobriety
roadblocks to prevent driving while intoxicated.
Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d
692 (1987).
There is also analogous Utah precedent.

In Industrial

Commission v. Wasatch Metal & Salvage Co., 594 P.2d 894 (Utah
1979) , this Court held that administrative searches under
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the. Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 must be
based on a warrant, and held a provision allowing searches
without a warrant unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment
and under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Although it appears possible that federal constitutional law
has deviated from the warrant requirement as to administrative
seizures for drivers license roadblocks, this Court should
treat an administrative seizure such as occurred in the roadblock
in this case the same as it treated the administrative search
in the case just cited, and require that roadblocks be instituted
only after obtaining a proper warrant to conduct such an administrative seizure in advance of the institution of the roadblock.
Such a procedure will provide real protections of the constitutional rights of the huge majority of innocent motorists,
while also providing an avenue for proper roadblocks to be
instituted when necessary in the opinion of a judicial officer
outside the executive branch who is trained in performing
the sort of constitutional balancing required.

At the least,

this Court should require statutory authorization for roadblocks
in order to make the decision politically accountable.
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III.
THE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IMPOSED
BY THE TAX COMMISSION TO TAX ZISSI
IN THIS CASE IS IMPROPER
A.

Relevant Principles of Statutory Construction.
There are three relevant principles of statutory

constructionf each of which has been violated by the Tax Commission's decision upholding the huge tax assessed against Petitioner.

Each of the principles is a common one.

The first

is that the terms of a statute should be given an interpretation
and application which is in accord with their usually accepted
meanings.

Board of Education of Granite School District v. Salt

Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983); Grant v. Utah State
Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971).

The second

principle is that taxing statutes are strictly construed against
the taxing authority and favorably to the tax payer. Continental
Telephone Co. of Utah v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 539
P.2d 447 (Utah 1975).

Thus, doubts as to meaning of terms

in a tax statute are to be resolved in favor of the tax payer.
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company v. State Tax Commission,
16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57 (1964), modified 16 Utah 2d 255,
399 P. 2d 145 (1965).

The third principle is that if by any

reasonable construction the statute can be made to harmonize
with constitutional provisions, it will be so construed.
State v. Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1983); Timpanogos
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Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water
Conservancy District, 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 1984).

In this casef

the Tax Commission failed to apply these provisions in two
respects.

First, by failing to assess taxes on the amphetamines

seized on the basis of their weight.

Second, by interpreting

the statutory term "dosage unit*1 to mean each individual pill
which was seized.

Each of these issues will be discussed

separately below in light of the principles of statutory
construction just described.

B.

Amphetamines Should Be Taxed By Weight.
U.C.A. § 59-19-103 imposes a tax on controlled substances

as follows:
(b)
On each gram of controlled substance,
or each portion of a gram, $200; and
(c) On each 50 dosage units of a controlled
substance that is not sold by weight, or portion
thereof, $2,000.
The Tax Commission found that amphetamines are sold
by the pill or quantity of pills when in pill form.

That

finding is not disputed, but its sufficiency to determine
whether the amphetamine pills which were seized should not
be taxed by weight is disputed.

The uncontested testimony

in this case is that amphetamines are generally sold in powder
form and generally sold by weight.

If these pills had been

ground into powder form, they would be taxed according to weight.
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The principles of statutory construction noted above
require that these pills should have been assessed on their
weight.

First, tax statutes must be strictly construed against

the taxing authority.

There is no question that amphetamines

are the controlled substance at issue here and that they are
sold by weight.

The statute makes no mention of the form

of the substance.

The tax on amphetamines should be assessed

by weight, because it is not a "controlled substance that
is not sold by weight."

U.C.A. § 59-14-103(c).

The tax would

be much less based on the weight of the substance, in fact,
the amount which was seized was probably not taxable based
on weight.

To allow the Tax Commission

to assess a tax hugely

out of proportion to the tax which would be assessed on a
similar amount of amphetamine powder is not indicated by the
terms of the statute and broadly, rather than strictly, construes
the taxing authority under the statute.
Finally, the construction given by the Tax Commission
exalts the form of the controlled substance over the controlled
substance itself, and creates an equal protection problem
in the enforcement of this statute, as will be discussed in
Section IV below.

In order to avoid the equal protection

problem of greatly different taxes based upon possession of
identical quantities of the same controlled substance, the
Tax Commission should charge taxes on amphetamines on the
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basis of weight, which is how they are generally sold*
The Tax Commission has authority to issue regulations
under the Stamp Tax. U.C.A. § 59-19-107. By following appropriate
rule-making procedures, the Tax Commission could interpret
the statute and determine which controlled substances are
sold by weight and which are not.

But without such rules,

it is improper for the Tax Commission to treat amphetamines
as taxable by weight in some circumstances and by the number
of pills in others, in order to impose the maximum conceivable
tax in every case.

C.
Even if the Tax Should be Assessed According to the
Number of Dosage Units, the Tax Commission Erred in Construing
Each Pill as a Dosage Unit.
U.C.A. § 59-19-103 (1) (c) imposes a tax of $2,000
"on each 50 dosage units of a controlled substance that is
not sold by weight.'1

There is no definition in the statutes

of the term "dosage units."

No regulations interpreting the

statutes have been issued by the Tax Commission.

There is

no reasonable way to arrive at a single pill being a dosage
unit if a pill does not constitute what a dosage would be.
Under the dictionary definitions in the record, a reasonable
interpretation of "dosage unit" is a standard measure of the
amount of a controlled substance taken at one time.

If 5

or 50 pills are taken as a dosage, that would be a dosage
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unit, because it would be the amount of amphetamines taken
as a dosage, which would be the single undivided whole dosage.
The Tax Commission gave a construction of the statute
which disregards the meaning of the term dosage and equates
the term dosage unit with unit dose, a term which all evidence
indicates is not intelligible to the average person.

The

construction given by the Tax Commission does not give the
words dosage unit their ordinary meaning.

It gives those

words a meaning known only in the medical profession, and
a meaning contrary to the common understanding of the term
dosage.

Gary Nuffer clearly understood the meaning of the

term dosage which he described as "what you would consume
at one time."

The Tax Commission simply hasn't followed the

definition it understood of that term in assessing this tax.
Rather than determine the meaning of "dosage units" by its
common meaning, the Tax Commission liberally construed that
term to provide for maximum taxation by equating each pill
with a dosage unit.

Finally, tax statutes are to be construed

to avoid constitutional problems, and the construction of
the term dosage units given by the Tax Commission creates
a constitutional problem of vagueness, as will be discussed
in Section V below, by giving a construction to the term which
is not intelligible to the ordinary person.
For these reasons, this Court should hold that if
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the tax should be based on the number of "dosage units," that
term should be given the meaning which would be ascribed by
ordinary people, which is the amount of controlled substance
taken on the average by abusers*

Petitioner has presented

evidence that that amount is not less than 5 pills per dosage
unit, and maybe as much as 100 pills.

IV.
THE TAX COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION
OF THE STATUTE CREATES A VIOLATION OF
EQUAL PROTECTION
If the statute requires the Tax Commission to tax
amphetamines on a per pill basis when in that form but on
the basis of weight when in powder form, that violates Mr. Zissi's
right to equal protection.

He is guaranteed the right to

equal protection of law by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and by Article I, Sections 7 and
24 of the Utah Constitution.
Equal protection protects against discrimination
within a class. The legislature has considerable
discretion in the designation of classifications
but the Court must determine whether such classifications operate equally on all persons similarly
situated. State Tax Commission v. Department
of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978).
In applying that principle, this Court determined that the
tax on one insurer from among a larger class of insurers to
pay a tax imposed on no one else is arbritrary and constitutionally
prohibited.
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This Court has also noted that Article I, Section
24 of the Utah Constitution incorporates the same general
fundamental principles as are incorporated in the equal protection
clause but that construction of Article I, Section 24 is not
controlled by federal courts' construction of the equal protection
clause.

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).

In that

case, in which the automobile guest statute was held to be
in violation of equal protection, the Court stated the test
for meeting equal protection standards.
Whether a statute meets equal protection standards
depends in the first instance upon the objectives
of the statute and whether the classifications
established provide a reasonable basis for
promoting those objectives* . . .
Article I, Section 24 protects against two
types of discrimination. First, a law must
apply equally to all persons within a class.
[cites] Second, the statutory classifications
and the different treatment given the classes
must be based on differences that have a reasonable
tendency to further the objectives of the statutes.
[cite] If the relationship of the classification
to the statutory objectives is unreasonable
or fanciful, the discrimination is unreasonable.
[cite] . _Id. at 670-71.
Applying these standards to this case, the purpose
of the Stamp Tax is to inhibit and punish those in possession
of controlled substances.

But the construction of the statute

claimed by the Tax Commission, imposes a $22,000 tax on Mr. Zissi
for possession of amphetamine pills while admitting that if
those pills had been crushed, the tax would be determined
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by weight and in this case no tax would be payable, is arbitrary
and capricious. The powder form of amphetamines must be regarded
as the more dangerous form, being readily injectible.

There

is no reasonable basis on which a person possessing an equal
amount of powdered amphetamines could receive no tax but this
petitioner be taxed $22,000 merely because of a difference
in the form in which the identical controlled substance is
discovered.

If the Tax Commission's construction of the Stamp

Tax statutes is correct, the statute must be unenforceable
as in violation of the federal and state equal protection
guarantees.
When persons are similarly situated, it is
unconstitutional to single out one person or
a group of persons from among a larger class
on the basis of a tenuous justification that
has little or no merit. Malan v. Lewis, supra,
at 671.

V.
THE TAX COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF A
"DOSAGE UNIT" TO MEAN EACH PILL, REGARDLESS
OF DOSAGE, RENDERS THE STATUTE
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND IN VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS
The Tax Commission claims that a "dosage unit" is
different from a dosage.

The Tax Commission relies on a term

common in medical circles, "unit dose" which is said to be
discussed in those circles as synonymous with "dosage unit"
in order to define a dosage unit as a single pill.

But both
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the pharmacist and the narcotics agent who testified about
this meaning agreed that people on the street don't use the
term dosage unit or unit dose and wouldn't know the meanings
which those terms have in medical circles.

The due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution

requires that statutes or regulations be sufficiently specific
to provide fair notice of what they proscribe* Basslett v. Cota,
761 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1985).

Statutes must provide adequate

warning as to what they command or forbid such that persons
of common intelligence will not have to guess at their meaning
and may act accordingly.

Fleming v. D.S. Department of Agricul-

ture, 713 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1983); State v. Blowers, 717
P.2d 1322 (Utah 1986).
two fold:

The problem with a vague statute is

it fails to provide the public with fair notice

of what is required, and it allows fundamentally legislative
decisions to be made on a subjective basis at the point of
enforcement rather than enactment. Record Head Corp. v. Sachen,
682 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1982).

In this case, the only interpre-

tation of the statute which persons of common intelligence
could understand is that a "dosage unit" is the amount which
would be taken as a dosage.

The term "dosage unit" in the

statute appears to be an attempt to make the statute more
fair by assessing the tax on the number of dosages comprising
a particular quantity of controlled substance.

A person of
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ordinary intelligence would understand the statute that way.
But the Tax Commission didn't rely on the amount that anybody
takes.

The only evidence is that the very minimum dosage

for someone taking these pills would be 5 pills, and more
commonly 50 - 100.

The lack of any definition of the term

in the statute and the lack of any regulations interpreting
the statute, render the obscure definition relied on from
the medical profession to make every pill a "dosage unit"
untenable and, if the statute must be interpreted that way,
the statute itself is unconstitutionally vague.

VI.
THE ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
IN THAT IT VIOLATES PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO FREEDOM
FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND UNDER ARTICLE 1,
SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "no person shall be . . . compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Article
I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides "the accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself."
The Fifth Amendment secures the right not to provide information
as long as that information may be used in a subsequent criminal
proceeding.

Garvey v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1974).

The rights provided by the Amendment arise whenever the government
seeks information that will subject the individual to criminal
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liability.

^Id. at 255. The possession of amphetamines without

a prescription is illegal under both Utah and Federal law.
The United States Supreme Court has established
a test to determine whether or not a tax statute violates
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, thus
making penalties for non-compliance unenforceable.

The test

consists of three elements:
(1) Whether the tax is in an area permeated
with penal laws and therefore directed towards
a select group inherently suspected of criminal
activities;
(2) Whether, in order to comply with the tax,
one is compelled to provide information which
he might reasonably suppose to be available
to prosecuting authorities; and
(3) Whether the compelled information is such
as would surely provide a significant link
in the chain of evidence tending to establish
guilt.
See Leary v. U.S., 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Marchetti v. U.S., 390
U.S. 39 (1968).
Under the federal statute in Marchetti, an individual
was required to register with the Internal Revenue Service,
buy wagering stamps, and post the stamps in a conspicuous
place. The Court found the statute created a "real and appreciable
. . . hazard of incrimination."

Ld. at 48.

The Supreme Court

found that the "petitioner was confronted by a comprehensive
system of federal and state prohibitions against wagering
activities, he was required to provide information which he
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might reasonably suppose would be available to prosecuting
authorities, and which would surely prove a significant link
in the chain of evidence tending to establish his guilt."
Id.
In Leary v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court
considered the Federal Marihuana Tax Act.

That Act imposed

a tax on marihuana transfers as well as an occupational tax
on those who dealt in the drug.

It required that marihuana

transfers be carried out on written forms provided by the
government.

The IRS was to keep copies of the forms and make

them available for inspection by treasury personnel and state
and loccil officials.

The Supreme Court struck down the act

as being in violation of the Fifth Amendment rights of those
subject to it.
The mere purchase of stamps under Utah's Illegal
Drug Tax Stamp Act is an admission of illegal activity.

The

law does not apply to persons lawfully in possession of controlled
substances. U.C.A. § 59-19-107(2). The possession of controlled
substances is an area permeated with penal laws.

In addition,

the very purchase of the tax stamps provides information which
the purchaser might suppose would be available to prosecuting
authorities, i.e. the identity of the purchaser.

There is

nothing in the statute to prevent the Tax Commission from
providing prosecuting authorities with information about the
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purchasers, such as their appearance, the amount of tax stamps
purchased, or the license number of their vehicle.

The statute

also requires the stamps to be affixed to the controlled substances.

Utah Code Annotated § 59-19-105 (1953, as amended).

In any prosecution for possession of controlled substances,
an element of scienter--knowing possession—must be shown.
Any person who attempts to comply with the Illegal Drug Stamp
Tax Act would thus be required to provide a significant piece
of evidence tending to show guilt by providing direct evidence
of knowing possession of illegal controlled substances.

The

purchase and display of the stamps is a significant link in
a chain of evidence tending to establish guilt for possession
of controlled substances.

Because each of the three elements

of the test for illegal self-incrimination required by a tax
law is satisfied, the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act should be
held unconstitutional under the Utah and United States Constitutions.

VII.
THE TAX ASSESSED IN THIS CASE CONSTITUTES
AN EXCESSIVE FINE OR FORFEITURE IN VIOLATION
OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution prohibit
imposition of excessive fines or the infliction of cruel and
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unusual punishment.

To assert a tax of $22,000 and a penalty

of an additional $22,000 against Zissi on the basis of alleged
possession of amphetamine tablets worth no more than $150
constitutes an excessive fine.

Presuming that the legislature

could pass a tax of any size it wanted for the possession
of drugs, the tax imposed is not proportionate with that assessable
to others.

A person in possession of an identical quantity

of amphetamine powder would probably not be taxed at all.
The fortituous situation of finding pills rather than powder
does not change the amount of controlled substance or its
danger to the public.

It is cruel and unusual and an excessive

fine to impose the tax in this case when it would not be imposed
in those cases.

The United States Supreme Court has held

that the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual
punishment prohibits sentences that are disproportionate to
the crime committed.

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).

This Court should adopt and apply a proportionality analysis
and hold that the tax and penalty assessed against Mr. Zissi
in this case is constitutionally invalid because Mr. Zissi
is taxed a total of $44,000 while a person in possession of
an identical quantity of amphetamine powder would not be taxed,
or at the least, at a disproportionately lower rate.
Although the United States Supreme Court has referred
to the Eighth Amendment as involving only criminal sanctions
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when it refused to extend the amendment to corporal punishment
in schools, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 669 (1977), the Utah
Constitutional provision has never been so narrowly interpreted.
At any rate, it should be recognized that the Illegal Drug
Stamp Tax Act is a criminal or quasi-criminal statute to which
the prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishment is applicable.

The United States Supreme Court

stated:
This Court has often stated that the question
whether a particular statutorily defined penalty
is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory
construction. Our inquiry in this regard has
traditionally proceeded on two levels. First,
we have set out to determine whether Congress,
in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicates
either expressly or impliedly a preference
for one label or the other. Second, where
Congress had indicated an intention to establish
a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether
the statutory scheme was so punitive either
in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49
(1980).
By calling the penalty imposed on possession of
controlled substances a tax, apparently the legislature wanted
the penalty to appear to be a civil one.

However, U.C.A,

§ 59-19-106 makes failure to obtain the drug stamps a third-degree
felony for which a specially enhanced penalty of $10,000 is
provided.

U.C.A. § 59-19-106.

Even with doubling the usual

fine for a third-degree felony, the tax and penalty in this
case far exceed the possible criminal penalty.
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The Supreme Court has indicated that there are seven
traditional elements in determining whether an act is penal
or regulatory in character.

All of the factors are relevant

to the inquiry, and may point in different directions.

The

factors are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint, whether it has historically
been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes
into play only on a finding of scienter, whether
its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence,
whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose
to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
In this case, the sanction of a tax nearly 150 times
the value of the property taxed would certainly be regarded
as punishment, and the requirement of the payment of such
an amount requires a finding of knowing possession, since
the legislature did not intend to tax persons such as common
carriers in unknowing possession of controlled substances.
The operation of this extremely punitive tax clearly promotes
the traditional aims of retribution and deterrence, and the
property which is taxed is already illegal to possess.

It

is submitted that there is no purpose other than punishment
and deterrence which could be the purpose of this statute.
Thus, of the factors which relate to this case at all, each
of the factors cited by the Supreme Court indicate that this
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statute is not a civil statute but is in reality a criminal
statute to which the prohibition against excessive fines clearly
applied.

CONCLUSION
The pills which were seized from defendant's truck
were seized illegally because the initial stopping of petitioner's
vehicle constituted an illegal seizure where the driver's
license checkpoint at which petitioner was stopped was created
at the whim of the field officers on patrol, without written
guidelines, directions or policies and procedures to govern
the location and conduct of a driver's license roadblock.
The Tax Commission has construed the statute to
maximum disadvantage of the taxpayer.

It clearly took the

punitive intent of the statute to heart. However, the insistence
on taxing amphetamines by the pill despite the evidence that
amphetamines are typically sold by weight, and the admission
that if these pills had been crushed, they would have been
taxed by weight, create an equal protection violation.

Taxing

$22,000 for possession of pills while the tax would be zero
if the pills had been ground up is a distinction without a
difference, an exaltation of form over controlled substance,
and is arbitrary and irrational.
Second, the Collection Division's interpretation
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of dosage unit to mean each individual pill, regardless of
the quantity of pills constituting a dosage creates a problem
of vagueness.

The words dosage unit have a meaning intel-

ligible to the ordinary person, just as they were to Gary
Nuffer, of how much a person takes.

The definition urged

by the Collection Division in reliance on a specialized meaning
known only to the medical profession makes the statute unintelligible to persons of ordinary intelligence and therefore
void for vagueness as a denial of due process.

To avoid these

constitutional problems, to give the statutory words their
ordinary meaning, and to construe the tax statute strictly
against the taxing authority, it is appropriate to determine
that these amphetamines should be treated like any other amphetamines and taxed on the basis of weight.

Or, at a minimum,

the Court should determine the dosage which would be taken
by people using these controlled substances.

The minimum

amount in evidence is 5 pills per dosage unit, and the maximum
amount is 100, with an average somewhere in between at 50
pills.
Becaues it does not prohibit the Tax Commission
from providing information relevant to determining the identity
of Tax Stamp purchasers and because affixing stamps to controlled
substances provides evidence of the crucial criminal element
of intent, the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violates Mr. Zissi's
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rights against self-incrimination and should be held invalid
and unenforceable.
Finally, because the statute violates the principle
of proportionality by imposing a huge tax on possession of
amphetamine pills while imposing no tax on the same quantity
of amphetamines in powder form, the tax constitutes an excessive
fine and is prohibited.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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1989.
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
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ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT

59-19-105

59-19-103. Tax imposed on marihuana and controlled substances.
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled substances as defined
under this chapter at the following rates:
(a) on each gram of marihuana, or each portion of a gram, $3.50;
(b) on each gram of controlled substance, or each portion of a gram,
$200; and
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a controlled substance that is not sold by
weight, or portion thereof, $2,000.
(2) For the purpose of calculating the tax under this chapter, a quantity of
marihuana or other controlled substance is measured by the weight of the
substance, whether pure or impure or dilute, or by dosage units when the
substance is not sold by weight, in the dealer's possession. A quantity of a
controlled substance is dilute if it consists of a detectable quantity of pure
controlled substance and any excipients of fillers.
History: C. 1953, 59-19-103, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 246, § 3.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988.

AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or afiSrmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

AMENDMENT V m
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
I, § 7

ART.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
nroeess of law.
ART.

I, §9

Sec. 9. [Excessive bail andfines—Cruelpunishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
ART. I, § 12
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

ART.

I, § 14

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.
A

* T . I,

§ 24

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

LARRY J. ZISSI,
Petitioner/
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FINAL DECISION
Appeal No. 88 2508

v.
AUDIT DIVISION OF THE
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Respondent.

This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
pursuant to the Rules of Administrative Procedure and the
Administrative Procedures Act for formal adjudicative proceedings
on the 28th day of February 1989.

James E. Harward, Presiding

Officer, heard the matter for and in behalf of the Tax
Commission.

Wayne Holman, Gary Nuffer and Lee Dever appeared

representing the Respondent.

David Bird appeared representing

Larry Zissi. Mr. Zissi was also present.
Evidence was taken, arguments were made and the matter
submitted to the Presiding Officer for his recommendation.

Based

upon the recommendation of the Presiding Officer and the facts and
evidence presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is the illegal drug stamp tax.

Appeal No. 88-25
2.

The period in question is June 4, 1988.

3.

On said date the Petitioner was stopped by the Utah

County Sheriff's office in a 1983 Chevrolet pickup truck license
plate number NC8331 at a routine traffic stop in conjunction with
a drivers license roadblock check.
4.

The vehicle was owned by the Petitioner.

5.

Subsequent

to the stop and as a result of the

search of the vehicle, the sheriff's office located a shaving kit
behind the drivers side of the vehicle which contained
approximately 550 tablets which were stipulated as being
amphetamines.
6.

No drug stamps were affixed to the amphetamines.

7.

A brief case located in the Petitioner's vehicle

contained money and was the property of the Petitioner.
8.

At the routine traffic stop, the officers were

suspicious of the vehicle.

When approaching the drivers side,

they smelled the odor of marijuana.

They then requested that the

vehicle pull to the side of the road.

At the side of the road,

the Petitioner then handed over to the officer a baggie and a
roach apparently containing marijuana.

Thereafter the vehicle was

searched for any other contraband or illegal drugs.

During the

course of the search, the amphetamines were located.
9.

The sheriff's office stopped all cars and vehicles

at the roadblock.
10.

The Respondent assessed a tax and penalty according

to state statute of $22,000 tax and $22,000 penalty.
-2-

11.

The tax was computed by taking the 550 pills divided

by 50 dosage units equals 11 times the statutory tax of $2,000
equaling $22,000 plus a 100% penalty.

(Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-103

<c>.)
12.

Under the terms of the statute, the term dosage unit

is equivalent to one pill.
13.

Amphetamines such as these are sold as pills and not

by weight.
14.

The Petitioner's statement that the shave kit did

not belong to him is selfserving and given little weight.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The taxes imposed upon a controlled substance as set

forth in Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-103 et. seq. in the sum of $2000
for each

50 dosage units of a controlled substance that is not

sold by weight.
2.

A stamp must be purchased to evidence the payment of

the tax imposed by the Utah Code.

Failure to affix the stamp or

to purchase the stamp results in an imposition of the tax plus a
civil penalty of 100% of the tax. (Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106.)
3.

The Tax Commission is bound to follow the state

statutes. (State Tax Commission vs Wright 596 Pacific Second 634,
636 Utah 1979.)

However, the Commission is not a judicial body

established under the constitution of the State of Utah nor is it
empowered or authorized to determine the legality or
constitutionality of legislative enactments.

(See Shea vs Utah

State Tax Commission 120 Pacific Second 274, 275 Utah 1941; State
Tax Commission vs Wright 596 Pacific Second 634, 636 (Utah 1979);
and Belco Petroleum Corporation vs State Board of Equalization 587
Pacific Second 204 (Wyoming, 1978).)

^^_

^„

Appeal NO. 88-25f
DECISION AND ORDER
The Petitioner has raised five issues in this matter.
They are:
1.

Whether or not the evidence should be suppressed due

to an unconstitutional search and seizure.
2.

Whether there is sufficient evidence that would

indicate that the illegal drugs were in the possession of the
petitioner.
3.
Ann.

Whether the statutory construction of Utah Code

§ 59-19-101 et. seq. is vague and therefore

unconstitutional.
4.

Whether the Petitioner's equal protection rights .

have been violated.
5.

Whether or not there has been a violation of the

Petitioner's due process.
The Tax Commission, in reviewing the evidence and
arguments at the hearing, shall divide the issues raised by the
Petitioner into those of substantive and constitutional
questions.

The constitutional questions involve the suppression

under an unconstitutional search and seizure, and the equal
protection and due process arguments.

The substantive issues are

those relating to possession and statutory construction as it
relates to definition of dose or dosage unit.

However, the two

issues overlap somewhat on the definition of dosage unit in that
the Petitioner argues that the term is sufficiently vague as to
render the application of the statute either discriminatory or
void for vagueness.
-4-

As to the constitution issues, the Tax Commission is an
administrative body established for the administration and the
overseeing of the taxing statutes.

As such, the Tax Commission

has no authority to determine the constitutionality of a state
statute.

The state statute in all cases before the State Tax

Commission is presumed to be constitutional and therefore
correct.

Therefore, the arguments as it relates to

constitutionality cannot be determined by the Tax Commission and
are therefore denied.
The argument that the stop and search was an
unconstitutional search and seizure suffers from the same problem
in that the Tax Commission has no authority to rule upon the
constitutionality of such conduct.

However, the Tax Commission

notes that it appears that the search was not a discretionary
search.

Every vehicle was stopped.

It also appears that there

are standards and guidelines published by the Utah County
Sheriff's office that govern such roadblock type searches.
The Tax Commission further finds that the arguments of
the Petitioner relating to equal protection and due process also
relate to a determination by the Commission as to whether or not
the statute is unconstitutional or void for vagueness.
determinations cannot be made by the Tax Commission.

These

However, the

Tax Commission notes that the statute on its face is clear and
does not leave the matter of determination open which would make
the statute void.
The Tax Commission finds that the testimony was clear and
convincing that a dosage unit under the terms of the statute is
one pill.

Appeal No. 88-251
The Tax Commission now turns to the substantive issues
before it.

Those substantive issues relate to the elements of the

offense or the need for a tax to be paid upon the illegal drugs.
The statute requires that a tax be imposed upon an illegal
controlled substance which is not sold by weight of $2000 for
every 50 dosage units.

To be responsible for the payment of that

tax, a person must acquire or possess in any manner seven or more
grams of any controlled substance or ten or more dosage units of
any controlled substance which is not sold by weight.

The Tax

Commission finds that there is sufficient evidence before it to
find that the Petitioner had acquired "in any manner" or possessed
ten or more dosage units of any controlled substance which is not
sold by weight.
It was stipulated that the controlled substance did not
have affixed to it the tax stamps which evidence payment of the
taxes required by the Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-101 et. seq.
The Petitioner argues that the controlled substance which
is the subject of this matter really is in all actuality sold by
weight and therefore the tax is substantially less on the
controlled substances than that as imposed by the Respondent.
Petitioner finds that this argument fails.

The

The evidence was clear

that the controlled substance was in pill form.

In pill form, it

is sold by pill and not by weight.
Therefore, it is the decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission, that the Petitioner's request be denied.
Specifically, the search and seizure which resulted in the
obtaining of the controlled substances was not unconstitutional.
-6-

Further, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the
Petitioner did have in his possession or in some manner acquired
the controlled substance.

Finally, that the term dosage unit used

in the statute means one pill.

Finally, the Tax Commission finds

that the Petitioner's arguments as it relates to equal protection
and violation of due process are denied.
DATED this ^ I At day of

, 1989.
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BY'ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
ABSENT
R.H. Hansen
Lair man

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

Joe B. Pacheco
Commissioner
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